FOREWORD
The International Energy Workshop (IEW) is a network of analysts concerned with international energy issues. Its aims are to compare long-term energy projections and to understand the reasons for diverging views . The IEW conducts iterative polling on key energy issues and publishes the results of these polls semi-annually . The pool results are discussed in annual meetings , alternating between Europe and North America. Participation in the IEW is informal and is open to anyone supporting the aims of the Workshop.
This report by Professor Manne of Stanford University and Dr. Schrattenholzer of IIASA describes the status and progress of the IEW in mid-1985. It served as background for the meeting held at IIASA in June 1985 .
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International Energy Workshop: a progress report Prof Alan S. Manne and Dr Leo Schrattenholzer THIS PAPER REVIEWS the activities of the International Energy Workshop (IEW) during the years 1984-85. Our report is focused upon the international oil price. We present frequency distributions of oil price projections made at different times. These lead to two major observations. First, the range of projections is wide, eliminating the hope that there might be at least a near-consensus among experts about the oil price developments. Secondly, the trend (median) of the oil price projections reflects the movement of current prices. The median projection of oil prices in the year 2000 has dropped by almost 40 per cent between 1981 and 1985 . This mirrors the trend in current prices between these years.
These two observations are consistent with a "random walk" model of oil prices. This model -like any other model -makes simplifying assumptions, but it exhibits an important feature, i.e. it produces a range of outcomes rather than a single value . The model thus emphasizes the uncertainty of projections into the future. Moreover, it clearly shows that the range of uncertainty widens as one looks further ahead. Basing this model upon the actual annual changes in the international oil price between 1970 and 1984 (and eliminating the biggest change as a statistical "outlier"), a range larger than I :3 is needed to include the oil price in the year 2000 with a probability of two-thirds. This means that the results of the random walk model suggest an even greater range of uncertainty than is indicated by the JEW poll itself.
Thus, the main result of the IEW is not a "best forecast" but a quantification of the range of uncertainty of the oil price projections. This means that the oil price of the more distant future cannot be assumed as a variable that can be calculated with reasonable precision. In decision-making, it is therefore risky to use any single number for the future oil price when attempting to quantify the consequences of decision alternatives. It seems much more reasonable to check decisions with a large number of possibilities and to hedge against both upside and downside risks.
In the remainder of our paper, we summarize the poll results with respect to energy quantities supplied and demanded: primary energy consumption; and oil and gas production, consumption and international trade.
The results are reported from two special surveys. One deals with the role of modelling methods for projecting international oil prices and the other with demand elasticities.
The activities of the International Energy Workshop
The International Energy Workshop provides a network for communication between analysts concerned with long-term international energy issues. It conducts iterative polling, compares alternative projections, and attempts to understand the reasons for diverging views. The poll results began to appear in 1981 and are now published semi-annually. They are discussed in annual meetings, alternating between Europe and North America. Participation in the JEW is informal and is open to anyone supporting the aims of the Workshop.
The poll covers only those items that are comparable in existing international energy statistics: crude oil prices, GNP growth, primary energy consumption, production and trade, and electricity generation. Typically, the respondents provide a "surprise-free" reference case. In addition, there may be alternative scenarios related, for example, to different economic growth rates.
No explicit probability estimates are assigned to the individual projections. Each reader is left to draw his own conclusions as to their plausibility. Some of the responses are generated by formal models and some by informal methods. All that is required is that an individual response constitute a logically consistent scenario for a given country or region.
The results are grouped geographically according to a standardized list of eight major regions, plus five individual countries/regions for which there are five or more poll responses. In addition, there is a geographical category labelled NEC, not classified elsewhere. Table 1 summarizes the regional distribution of the responses included in the January 1985 edition of the poll . Altogether, there were 345 individual responses from 75 participants. On average, each participant provided five responses covering alternative scenarios and/or regions.
Thanks to the United Nations Statistical Office, the quality of the JEW data base has been greatly improved. We are now in a position to compare UN energy statistics (for 1970-1982) with the poll medians for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 . Unlike earlier editions of the poll, there is only one areathe international oil trade -in which there are major inconsistencies in the 1980 base year statistics. If the UN energy statistics are taken literally, the world has become a net importer of crude oil and there has been a growing trend in this direction since 197 5 ! Some of these difficulties represent definitional problems (bunkers, products versus crude oil, etc), but others are apparently associated with national secrecy concerning the oil trade. 
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The IEW is in its fifth year. It has become possible to make comparisons not only between contemporary projections, but also between those made at different times. When making these comparisons, however, it must be recognized that the group of individual respondents has not remained constant from one survey to the next and that this change of the underlying sample could explain part of the observed change.
The 1985 edition of the IEW poll contains only those responses bearing publication dates of 1983 or later. It is essential to standardize for the date of publication if we are to obtain a better understanding of the wide range of views among different groups making long-term projections of international crude oil prices. Oil prices are shown here as index numbers, expressed in currency units of constant purchasing power with 1980 = 100. To convert to 1984 dollars per barrel, multiply by 0.42. Thus, the 1984 index value = 67 (equivalent to $2 8/barrel). A solid line connects the median projection for 1990 with those for 2000 and 2010. According to the conventional wisdom (the poll medians), the oil glut of the mid-l 980s will disappear by 1990. OPEC will then increase its market share and prices will begin a sustained climb to 2000 and beyond.
International oil prices
Space limitations do not permit us to provide detailed comments on each of the individual projections. It should be noted, however, that the highest price scenario (REGLD) was not the outcome of an independent model of the world oil market. Rather, it was designed to generate a low demand scenario for a single country, Sweden. Figure 2 puts the median oil price projections into some perspective . First, they are compared with the historical data on the refiners' acquisition costs of crude oil imported into the US, adjusted by the US GNP deflator (see Energy Information Administration, 1984) . If the series were based on currency units other than US dollars -or if it were based upon other grades or locations of crude oil -the precise amounts of change would differ, but there would still be the same general appearance -the two price jumps of 197 3 -7 4 and 1979 -80 followed by several years of downward drift. Figure 2 also compares the 1/85 medians with those made at two previous dates: 12/81 and 7 /83. The median projection of the oil price in the year 2000 has dropped by almost 40 per cent between 1981 and 1985. This is almost the same as the 33 per cent decline in the real price of crude oil (measured in US dollars) during the same period. Beth of these median projections imply a three per cent annual increase in the real oil price between the date of the forecast and the year 2000. These results cannot be explained away simply by differences in the group of respondents from one date to the next.
Like so many other comparisons of energy forecasts, this one has the appearance of a downward-folding fan. For a given date, each successive price path is lower than its predecessor. Yergin et al (1984) describe this phenomenon by saying that "Today's Vintage V (price forecast) is, like those preceding it, overwhelmingly shaped by the projection of current circumstances into the future".
In more technical terms, this may be described as "adaptive expectations". That is, each new projection begins with the then-current oil price. Past trends are extrapolated linearly (or exponentially) from that point -with or without independent cross-checks.
These ideas may be formalized through a stochastic process known as a random walk model. It is supposed that each year's percentage price changes are independent of those that occurred the previous year. When accumulated over time, the total change approaches a log-normal probability distribution. This has an important practical result. The range of uncertainty widens with the distance into the future.
In figure 3 (reproduced from Manne, 1985) , the "drift" and variance parameters have been based upon the history of international oil prices through 1984. On this basis, there is an 84 per cent probability that future oil prices will lie below the upper dotted line, and a 16 per cent probability that they will lie below the lower one.
The random walk model suggests an even greater uncertainty of outcomes than is indicated by the IEW poll itself. Although this conclusion is based upon a simple model, it appears robust enough to suggest that there is little hope for high precision with respect to long-term price forecasts. Price movements are essential for equilibrating supplies and demands, and it would be desirable to have more precise long-term forecasts. From the viewpoint of a prudent decision-maker, however, all that can be done is to be aware of the range of uncertainty and to hedge against both upside and downside risks. 
Primary energy consumption and conservation
Figure 4 provides an overview of total primary energy consumption. In 1980, the industrialized countries (the USSR/Eastern Europe together with the OECD) had only 27 per cent of the world's population, but consumed 80 per cent of the commercial primary energy. This is much the same pattern as prevailed in 1970 and -according to the poll medians -this is likely to persist through 2000. The developing countries have rapidly growing populations, but will be unable to afford the cost of large increases in energy consumption during the next two decades.
Energy quantities are less volatile than prices. In percentage terms, there are only minor differences between the 7 /83 and the 1/85 median projections of GNP growth and total energy consumption for the year 2000. The decrease in consumption (between the 1983 and 1985 polls) is almost entirely due to a decline in the projection for nuclear energy. The overall change reflects the worsening outlook for this specific sector, and cannot be explained by changes in the composition of the IEW poll.
Although the developing countries (OPEC and NODC) will not become major energy consumers in absolute terms, their demands are likely to grow rapidly in relation to past levels. According to figure 5, the energy consumption of OECD nations will continue to grow at a slower rate than GNP. In part, this may result from a shift away from exports of energy-intensive products. Outside the OECD region, the median view is that energy consumption will grow at almost the same rate as GNP. In the OPEC nations, this may represent a shift towards export-oriented industries such as petrochemicals based upon domestic natural gas.
For the non-OPEC developing nations, there is a near-constancy of the energy-GNP ratio. This needs further examination. Because of the changing mix between agriculture, manufacturing and services, there may be few opportunities for energy conservation in this region. But there is an alternative view -that the prospects for conservation have not been studied as intensively in the developing nations as in the OECD region. On the demand side, this is virtually the same issue that Odell (1983) has raised with respect to the supply of oil. That is, the developing countries have not yet made a thorough exploration of their options either for oil production or for energy conservation. For a detailed breakdown of primary energy consumption by fuel, see table 2. This table includes the contributions from each of the primary sources of energy: oil, gas, coal, nuclear and renewables. The category of "renewables" combines conventional hydro-electric and geothermal along with solar and other renewables. We continue to obtain erratic responses to poll item 16 (solar and other renewables). There are no uniform accounting conventions in this area. At the global level, the 11 individual responses for the year 2000 covered a range from 2 to 2,110 million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe) ! For the year 2000, table 2 includes a category termed "conservation". This is defined as the difference between the amounts of primary energy from the physical sources of supply -and the amount that would have been consumed ifthe energy-GNP ratio had remained constant since 1980. This is not an independent analytical concept, but it provides a convenient shorthand way to describe a variety of forces : government directives, priceinduced substitution, demand saturation and structural changes in the pattern of GNP growth. For the OECD nations, table 2 indicates that conservation is likely to contribute more in the way of new energy than the combined total of all the conventional sources of supply. It is unclear whether this outcome is based upon a careful sector-by-sector analysis, or whether it represents a trend extrapolation from the 1970-80 decade with its two oil price adjustments.
Oil and gas production and trade
At the regional level defined by the IEW, there is a negligible amount of international trade in coal and electricity. Since oil and gas are the principal commodities that move in international trade, we shall focus only on these two items. Figure 6 presents the poll medians of the global outlook for oil consumption, production and trade. According to most respondents, there will be only minor increases from the 1980 level of production for the world as a whole. This view is hotly disputed by a number of Workshop participants. They hold that leasing and taxation issues have led the oil industry to systematically understate the geological prospects. On this basis, they estimate that the world's ultimately recoverable conventional resources may be 3 -6 trillion barrels rather than 2 trillion barrels (today's conventional wisdom). If the minority view is correct, the world's oil industry can continue to expand through 2000 and beyond. Given the range of views on oil production and consumption, it is no wonder that there are even wider ranges of opinion on how much will be exported by OPEC, the "swing" producer, throughout this period.
For a summary of the poll medians on natural gas, see figure 7 . At a global level, gas production prospects appear brighter than those for oil. There is general agreement that the resource base in the USSR and in OPEC will permit production to continue to expand, but that expansion will not be possible for the OECD countries. Increases in OECD consumption will have to be matched by increases in imports from the gas-surplus regions.
Methods of projecting international oil prices
Among the IEW participants, some groups rely on formal models. Others employ expert judgement and scenario analysis. Each of these approaches has its pros and cons. Formal models may easily become divorced from practical realities. Expert judgements are inherently subjective, and 
Exports
Imports may be overly influenced by current events. From the individual IEW poll responses, there is no direct way to determine, for example, whether oil prices represent an input assumption based upon expert judgement, or whether they represent the independent output of a formal model in which prices serve to equilibrate supplies and demands. All that is known is that the prices and quantities together form a logically consistent picture. In order to obtain a better understanding of the methods used by the poll respondents, we asked them to indicate how they arrived at the international oil prices associated with their projections. To date, specific information is available for only half of the poll participants. In table 3, these responses have been grouped into three categories: those that reported the use of a formal model of international oil prices at some point in the analytical process; those where the origin of the projected oil prices is somewhat ambiguous; and those that reported only the use of expert judgements. We are aware that this table is incomplete, and that it may contain inaccuracies. Corrections and additions will be welcomed. Table 3 suggests that only a minority of poll respondents base their projections upon formal models for the determination of international oil prices . Most rely upon informal methods. Even among those that do employ international oil models, it is clear that the results are cross-checked in other ways. In any case, the independence of the oil price projections is an important problem that deserves further investigation.
Because there are advantages in both formal and informal approaches, a combination of methods may be more reliable than any one by itself. The advantages of a combined approach have been documented empirically in short-term macro-economic and sales forecasting. See, for example, Makridakis and Winkler (1983) . In these cases , there is evidence that a consensus forecast may have a lower average error than the individual analyses from which it is built up. The same principles may also apply to long-term projections of international oil prices and the quantities traded.
. Demand elasticities survey
In the market economies, price changes provide an incentive for energy conservation. Accordingly, it seemed useful to conduct a separate poll on the values of the price and income elasticities of demand that are either explicit or implicit in the IEW poll responses. For this purpose, we concentrated on those in which the international price of oil is an output result rather than an input assumption.
The original poll responses do not enable us to determine whether oil prices are an input or an output. They do, however, provide one clue along these lines. Since oil prices are unlikely to be an output when the analysis is confined to a single country or to a small region of the world, it was supposed that oil prices might be an output of each of the two dozen responses that included both oil prices and the quantities consumed either for the OECD region or for the market economies as a whole. In February 1984, these groups were asked the following questions: (a) In principle, would it be possible to make a controlled comparison, employing an oil price or a GNP growth different from your baseline projections?
(b) In practice, by July 1984, will it be possible for you to send in one or more IEW poll forms , making a controlled comparison (for the OECD region and/or for the market economies as a whole) covering the following scenarios ?
(i) Gradual productivity gains (or losses) leading to a GNP growth index (1980 = 100) that is 25 points lower (or higher) than your baseline response for the year 2000.
Autumn 1986(ii) Gradual oil supply gains (or losses) leading to an oil price index (1980 = 100) that is 25 points lower (or higher) than your baseline response for the year 2000.
In effect, question (a) asks whether the projections are based upon a formal model that is currently operational. Question (b) is divided into two parts. From the response to part (i), one can infer GNP elasticities (holding oil prices constant). From part (ii), one can estimate the price elasticities (holding GNP constant). These questions appear straightforward, but in practice turned out to be somewhat ambiguous. It was not until late 1984 that we succeeded in obtaining nine usable responses. In retrospect, it was an error to have requested price and GNP variations in terms of index points rather than percentage changes. Accordingly, the quantity responses are not reported directly, but are converted into the elasticity estimates shown in table 4.
A number of poll participants declined to take part in this survey. Some were unable to do so because their analyses were based upon expert judgement/scenario methods rather than upon formal models. Controlled comparisons then become difficult or impossible. Others were unable to participate in the survey because of lack of time -or because their models were no longer operational. Among the groups that responded, one requested anonymity and is therefore labelled RESPX (respondent X). Another (EIA) was unable to report numerical results beyond 1995.
According to table 4, the consensus view is that the GNP elasticity of oil consumption is approximately 1.0, and that the intermediate-run price elasticity is 0.3 . That is, a one per cent change in GNP will lead to a one per cent change in oil consumption -holding prices and other demand determinants constant; and a one per cent increase in crude oil prices will lead to a three per cent decline in consumption -holding GNP, etc, constant.
Among the GNP elasticities, the only significantly different value from unity is that of Singer (1983) -here abbreviated SINGR. His poll response is based on a case in which the total OECD demand for oil would grow at 1.5 per cent per year if prices remained constant. This may be interpreted in terms of a GNP elasticity of 0.6 and a GNP growth rate of 2.5 per cent per year. The low GNP elasticity goes a long way towards explaining why Singer's oil price projections are so much lower than others.
Because of one unanticipated difficulty, the price elasticities are labelled as intermediate, rather than long run. That is, the questionnaire asked the participants to run their models with gradual rather than sudden changes. A gradual change is more realistic in appearance, but is not as efficient for computing a long-run price elasticity. In several of these models, no (1982) . There, all the models were run under the general guideline that 0.6 was the long-run price elasticity of demand for crude oil. This was exactly the numerical value adopted for the OECD region in the scenario described here as TRT6 (Manne and Preckel). This was also the elasticity input assumption adopted by IEW respondent G ATLY (Gately) .
Among the price elasticities shown in table 4, the lowest value is 0.1 (reported by IIASA). This result can be traced directly to the methodology employed in the IIASA global energy studies. GNP growth and the MEDEE accounting framework together determine the demands for "useful" energy services. Accordingly, energy prices affect interfuel substitution, but not the level of useful energy demands. This appears to be the principal reason for the low price elasticities of oil consumption that are implicit in the IIASA results.
A value of 0.54 (for CIES) is the highest among the intermediate-run price elasticities shown in table 4. It is unclear whether this response represents a controlled comparison between the price and the income effects of additional oil supplies. If this does represent a controlled comparison, the CIES scenarios imply that oil prices have an extraordinarily high impact upon long-term GNP growth rates. For the OECD region in the year 2000, the GNP index is 197 in CIESH versus 173 in CIESL (the high versus low demand scenario) .
Concluding comment
This paper has shown that there continues to be a wide range of viewpoints on the long-range outlook for international energy supplies, demands and prices. Rather than attempt to promote an artificial consensus in this area, we believe that the role of the IEW is to reach second-order agreement. That is, how wide is the range of uncertainty likely to be? At a number of points, we have reported median values, but these are not intended as the best or the most likely forecasts . We use these because they represent perhaps the most descriptive single summary description of the responses. Any translation from poll results into probability distributions is at the risk of the translator. 170.00
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